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STATUTES REPRODUCED

Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-11

(Effective May 12, 1981)

The board or the commission may upon its own motion,
and shall upon the verified complaint in writing of any person,
investigate or cause to be investigated the actions of any real
estate broker or real estate salesman, or any person who shall
assume to act as such, within this state, and may suspend or
revoke any license issued under the provisions of this chapter at
any time where the licensee has by false or fraudulent
representation obtained a license, or where the licensee in
performing or attempting to perform any of the acts mentioned in
this capter is found guilty of:
(8) Being unworthy or incompetent to act as a real
estate broker or salesman in such a manner as
to safeguard the interests of the public;
(15) Willful or deliberate violation or disregard
of the provisions of this chapter or of the
rules and regulations of the commission.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(2)
Within four years:
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided by law.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-33
The limitations prescribed in this article shall apply
to actions brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state
in the same manner as to actions by private parties.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated SS 63-46(b)-16 and 78-2a3(2)(a) (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition from the Final Order of the Utah
Real Estate Commission and the Executive Director of the
Department of Business Regulation revoking the license of
Petitioner to practice as a principal broker in the State of
Utah.

Consistent with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated

Section 61-2-12(1)(b), the Final Order in this matter issued
December 15, 1988.

Petitioner filed this petition for review

with the instant court on January 12, 1989.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in

denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss based on his finding that
no Statute of Limitations governed the initiation of an action in
an administrative setting.
II. Whether the Order of the Utah Real Estate
Commission was reasonable and rational.
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE
The following statutes are determinative of this case,
and must therefore be considered by the Court:
1.

Utah Code Ann. SS 61-2-11, 61-2-11(8), 61-2-11(15)

(1953, as amended).

2.

Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-25(2), 78-12-33 (1953, as

amended).
Due to the length of these statutes, they are
reproduced in the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Judicial Review of an order of
the Utah Real Estate Commission ("Commission") revoking Juanita
Taft Rogers' ("Petitioner's") license to practice as a
estate principal broker in the State of Utah.

real

The administrative

action against Petitioner's real estate license was filed by the
Division of Real Estate ("Division") via a petition dated
November 25, 1987, in Case No. RE-87-08-02.

Petitioner

subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 13, 1988, the
original date for hearing, based upon a claim that the action of
the Division of Real Estate was barred by a statute of
limitations.

Limited oral argument was taken on the motion at

that time and counsel for the respective parties subsequently
filed memoranda with the court.

Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss

was denied in an Order dated July 21, 1988.

On September 20,

1988 the case against petitioner came on for hearing before

J.

Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge of the Department of
Business Regulation.

This hearing was delegated to Judge Eckund

for hearing by the Utah Real Estate Commission as per Utah Code
Annotated §61-2-5.5(1)(c).

Based on the evidence taken in the

hearing, Judge Ecklund made Recommended Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order to the Utah Real
Estate Commission on December 14, 1988. On December 14, 1988,
the Utah Real Estate Commissioners, by unanimous action, adopted
Judge Ecklund's Recommended Findings, Conclusions and Order as
their own, and on December 15, 1988, William E. Dunn, Executive
Director of the Department of Business Regulation confirmed and
approved the order as provided by law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are from the Commission's findings
and apparently are undisputed by Petitioner.
1.

Sometime in 1973, Petitioner became licensed as a

sales agent by the Division of Real Estate. As relevant herein,
Petitioner was affiliated with principal broker David R. Harman
as of January 1982. On September 1, 1982, she terminated her
affiliation with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with principal
broker A.J. Michaels.
2.

By Order, dated August 17, 1983, Petitioner's

license was suspended for one year and thereafter placed on
probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions.
Said order was based on conduct which occurred between December
10, 1981 and August 22, 1982.

Petitioner's conduct in that

regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation
of the fiduciary duty owed to her clients in that transaction.
Petitioner subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on
January 15, 1987,
3.

In January, 1982, Barbara Homeyer contacted

Petitioner to obtain her services in purchasing a home. Ms.

Homeyer, who was recently divorced resided in a home jointly
owned by herself and her ex-husband.

Since there had been no

property settlement relative to her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's exhusband was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home,
the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide a down
payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various
items of inherited personal property.
4.

During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Petitioner

entered into a verbal agreement, whereby Respondent was to act as
Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective
seller who would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down
payment for the purchase of a home.

On February 21, 1982,

Petitioner and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property.

Ms. Homeyer

then delivered that property to Petitioner, which was held in
storage under Petitioner's control.

The property was so

transferred to Petitioner as the means to provide a safe place
for its storage and facilitate Petitioner's access to that
property if a prospective seller was located.
5.

Between February and late-April 1982, Petitioner

and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two properties for possible
purchase.

In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as

too those items of Ms. Homeyer's personal property which would be
acceptable in lieu of a cash down payment.

When it became

apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the abovedescribed terms would be realized, she authorized Petitioner to
sell certain items as the means to provide cash for the down
payment necessary to purchase a home.

6.

During March and April 1982, Petitioner had some of

Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and certain items were sold in
antique shows.

However, as of late April 1982, no progress in

locating a suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer had
received no monies from Petitioner relative to the sale of some
of her property and Petitioner had taken certain property from
storage and sold it without Ms. Homeyer's authorization.
Further, Petitioner never advised her principal broker of her
activities no did she deliver to him any of the funds she
obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property.
7.

In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer

underwent foot surgery and was advised that her condition could
be cancerous.

At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home

would be found and whether that would occur prior to her possible
death.

On May 5, 1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Petitioner and they

executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of
her personal property to Petitioner for sale and/or exchange and
authorized Petitioner to liquidate that property.

The agreement

further provided that if all property held by Petitioner was not
liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the remaining funds
would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor
children.
8.

During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was never

advised as to the status of her property and was unable to
contact Petitioner in that regard.

In mid-July 1982, Ms. Homeyer

retained counsel and made written demand that Petitioner return
all personal property in her possession and provide an accounting

as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property
which had been in her possession.
9.

By letter, dated October 21, 1982, Peitioner

generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts which had been
undertaken to appraise, restore, and/or sell some of the property
in her possession.

Petitioner further mentioned various costs

incurred as to th€> appraisal and restoration of that property.
Petitioner also reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken
to produce funds necessary for a down payment for a home or
condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had
yet been identified.

Petitioner requested Ms. Homeyer to keep

her posted "about what you want to do with the housing thing" and
she advised Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse
duplex and pondered that Ms. Homeyer could live in one side and
rent the other.
10.

By letter, dated October 28, 1982, Ms. Homeyer

advised Petitioner that purchase of the duplex would not be
economically feasible and reiterated that no accounting had been
received as to the status of her property or any disposition
thereof.

By letter, dated October 29, 1982, a second demand was

made that Petitioner return all items of personal property
entrusted to her.

When compliance with that demand was not

forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation.

No accounting was

provided to Ms. Homeyer until July 9, 1986, when Petitioner
returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin.
11.

By stipulation, dated October 7, 1986, Ms. Homeyer

and Petitioner identified the status of some of the property

which had been in Petitioner's possession.

That property

consisted of guns, cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin
collection, silver, jewelry, flatware, china, pewter, furniture,
household and other miscellaneous items.

The value of the

property which Petitioner sold was agreed to have been $6,530.50
and Petitioner received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property.
It was agreed that certain property, valued at $6,799.50, was
delivered by Petitioner to third parties and that said property
had not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer.

It was also agreed that

certain property still in Petitioner's possession should be
valued at $4,820.50.
12.

Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had

delivered to Petitioner was subsequently returned to her.
However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated
October 30, 1986, the Court concluded that Petitioner had sold
some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with
Ms. Homeyer's possession and control of some of the property by
intentionally refusing to return it and had converted the
proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use.
By reason thereof, the Court entered judgment on October 30, 1986
in favor of Ms. Homeyer totaling $2,035.50 as a result of
Petitioner's breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms.
Homeyer, $4,495.00 as a result of Petitioner's conversion of
proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a result of
result of Petitioner's conversion of property upon transferring
that property to others and $4,820.50 as a result of Petitioner's
conversion of property still in her possession.

13.

The record also reflects that Petitioner initiated

bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the
October 30, 1986 judgment against her, an order was entered in
those bankruptcy proceedings relative to Petitioner, whereby the
just-stated judgment was discharged.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Administrative disciplinary actions are neither civil
nor criminal, and are therefore not subject to general statutes
of limitation governing those types of proceedings.

Had the Utah

Legislature intended for administrative disciplinary actions
involving real estate licensees to be subject to a statute of
limitations, it would have included one in the statutory scheme
governing the real estate profession.

However, not only did the

Legislature elect not to impose a statute of limitations, but
specified that disciplinary action could be taken "at any time"
that a licensee was found guilty of licensing law violations.
This case is subject to the pre-Utah Administrative
Procedures Act standard of review found in Utah Department of
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P,2d
601 (Utah 1983).

The Court must determine whether the

Commission's conclusions of law and order of revocation were
reasonable and rational, while according due deference to the
Commission's specialized knowledge and expertise.

The facts in

this case clearly indicate that Petitioner did not act in her
client's best interest, breached the fiduciary duty she owed as
an agent to her principal, and caused considerable financial

damage to her client.

Inasmuch as the Commission constitutes a

"jury of Petitioner's peers,"

it was in the best position to

determine that her actions were a violation of both rule and law
governing the real estate profession, and that the best way to
protect the public's welfare was to revoke Petitioner's real
estate license.

The Commission's actions were both reasonable

and rational, and should therefore be upheld.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS URGED UPON
THE COURT BY PETITIONER DOES NOT APPLY TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
A. The General Statute of Limitations found in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-2(2) has no application to a controversy not
involving an "action" or a "cause of action".
The Petitioner would have this court accept that the
administrative disciplinary action taken against her license was
a "civil " proceeding, and therefore subject to the general
statute of limitations found in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-1, et
seq. (1953, as amended).

This position completely ignores the

special position administrative actions have in the law.
Administrative actions are neither civil nor criminal
proceedings.
Petitioner places great emphasis on her position that
administrative actions are "civil actions", and defines a "civil
action" as "an adversary proceeding for redress, enforcement or
protection of a right, or prevention of a wrong." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 8, emphasis added.)

However, a hearing before an

administrative board is not adversary.

An administrative board

represents "public interests entrusted to boards, whereas courts
are concerned with litigating rights of parties with adverse
interests."

Black's Law Dictionary/ Revised 5th Ed. 1979.

Administrative proceedings which involve possible
disciplinary sanction as to licensees are neither strictly civil
nor criminal in nature.

The Washington Supreme Court addressed

this issue in In re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 319 P.2d 824 (1958),
when it held:
It is somewhat difficult to classify a medical
disciplnary proceeding. It is characterized as civil,
not criminal, in nature, yet it is quasi criminal in
that it is for the protection of the public, and is
brought because of alleged misconduct of the doctor
involved. It's consequence is unavoidably punitive,
despite the fact that it is not designed entirely for
that purpose. It is not strictly adversary in nature.
It is essentially a special,
somewhat unique, statutory
proceeding, in which the medical profession (under
state authorization through the medical disciplinary
board) inquires into the conduct of a member of the
profession and determines whether disciplnary action
is to be taken against him in order to maintain sound
professional standards of conduct. . . (Emphasis in
original.)
Kindschi, 319 P.2d at 825-26.
Other states have also addressed the issue of whether
or not administrative proceedings before boards seeking
disciplinary action against professional licensees are civil
actions.

They too have found that such proceedings are "neither

civil nor criminal in nature."

Nelson v. Real Estate Commission,

35 Md.App. 334, 370 A.2d 613 (1977);

Commerce City Drug v. State

Board of Pharmacy, 511 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1973).
Utah lawmakers have recognized the uniqueness of
administrative proceedings by enacting the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated S 63-46b-l, et seq ("UAPA").
That act, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure currently
governs administrative procedures in this state.

The instant

proceeding, filed prior to the effective date of the UAPA, was
governed by the "Rules of Procedure for Hearings before the
Department of Business Regulation" (Adopted June 23, 1983.)

The

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except as specifically referenced
in those department rules, had no application to licensing
matters filed in the administrative forum.
The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed the specific
issue of whether or not, absent a specific statute of
limitations, a general statute of limitations can be applied to
administrative disciplinary actions.

In Colorado State Board of

Medical Examiners v. Jorqensen, 599 P.2d 869, the Court held
that, "[T]he general statute of limitations applies to the
commencement of legal actions-i.e., civil or criminal actions-not
to the institution of an administrative disciplinary proceeding."
Applying Colorado's Jorgensen Rule

to this case, it is

clear that the action against Petitioner's license is not a legal
action, being neither civil nor criminal, but is an
administrative disciplinary action.

Therefore, the general

statute of limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) does
not apply.
Petitioner also argues that the general statute of
limitations found in Utah Code Annotated S 78-12-25(2) should
apply to the disciplinary proceeding filed against Petitioner
because of the language of S 78-12-33, which says:

M

The limitations prescribed in this article shall apply
to the actions brought in the name of or for the
benefit of the State in the same manner as to actions
by private parties. ••
This statute clearly applies only to those actions
wherein the state acts as a private party in a proprietary
manner.

It certainly does not apply to those situations when the

state is acting in its exclusive governmental police power
function of protecting the public welfare.
At common law, the state was immune from statutes of
limitation under the rule of nullum tempus
occurrit
regi (time does not run against the king). Although
the doctrine was originally established as a royal
prerogative similar to sovereign immunity, its role
under modern law is to prevent the public from
suffering 'because of the negligence of its officers
and agents' in failing to assert causes of action which
belong to the public. The rule applies if the right
which the governmental unit seeks to assert is in fact
a right belonging to the general public. It does not
apply if the right belongs only to the government.
Trimble v. American Sav. Life Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1131,
1138 (Ariz.App. 1986).
When the state, or one of its agencies, is performing
governmental functions, as opposed to proprietary functions not
unlike those performed by private individuals, the state must
specifically waive its immunity.
Governmental functions are those which are performed
for the general public with respect to the common
welfare and for which no compensation or particular
benefit is received, while 'proprietary functions' are
exercised when an enterprise is commercial in character
or is usually carried on by private individuals or is
for the profit, benefit or advantage of a governmental
unit conducting the activity.
State Ex Re. Schneider v. McAfee, 2 Kan. App. 2d 274,
578 P. 2d 281 (1978).

Certainly the action taken by the Division of Real
Estate against the license of Petitioner to practice as a real
estate broker was purely governmental, and in no way proprietary.
The Division was seeking to protect the public from Petitioner's
unprofessional conduct, and its action can in no way be
interpreted as that of a "private party", inasmuch as the
regulatory power exercised by the Division and the Commission is
an exclusively governmental power.

B. Had the Legislature intended for there to be a
statute of limitations for administrative licensing disciplinary
actions, it would have established one within the specific
statutes governing the Department of Business Regulations or the
Division of Real Estate.
The Department of Business Regulations (now the
Department of Commerce) is governed by chapter 1, Title 13 of the
Utah Code.

The Division of Real Estate was, and is, governed by

Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-1, et seq.

Neither of these two

bodies of law restrict the filing of administrative actions by
imposing a statute of limitations.

In fact Utah Code Annotated §

61-2-11 says that the Real Estate Commission, with the
concurrence of the Executive Director of the Department, may take
disciplinary action against a license "at any time" if the
licensee is found guilty of any of the enumerated violations of
the licensing law.

This statutory wording, given its plain

meaning, certainly implies that the Commission's disciplinary
actions may be taken without regard to any statute of
limitations.

Inasmuch as the whole scheme of licensing professions
in this state is undertaken for the protection of the public, as
referenced in Utah Code Annotated § 13-1-1 (1953, as amended) it
would surely be against public policy to allow licensees, such as
the Petitioner, to elude accountability for bad acts by simply
hiding the facts from the applicable regulatory body until after
a specific time period passed.

POINT II
THE COMMISSION'S ACTION IN REVOKING THE
LICENSE OF PETITIONER TO PRACTICE AS A
PRINCIPAL BROKER IN THE STATE OF UTAH WAS
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL
The Petition filed against Petitioner's license to
practice as a Real Estate Principal Broker, in Case No. RE 87-0802, was filed November 25, 1987, and is therefore a pre-UAPA
case.

The Court reviews pre-UAPA cases using the three pronged

test found in Utah Department of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).

Since

Petitioner does not challenge the Commission's Findings of Fact
in this case, and only touches upon the Conclusions of Law
collaterally in her direct attack upon the sanction imposed by
the Commission, it will only be necessary for the Division to
address the standard of review for the conclusions of law and the
order.
In reviewing the Commission's Order revoking
Petitioner's license, this Court must, under the Administrative
Services rationale, "afford great deference to the technical

- 14 -

expertise or more extensive experience of the responsible
agency."

Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 610. Although,

deference to the Commission's expertise is appropriate, the Court
must also decide whether the Order of Revocation was within the
bounds of reasonableness or rationality under the circumstances.
Plaintiff does not dispute the Commission's Findings of
Fact and in her brief adopts them as the facts in this case.

It

is therefore unnecessary for this Court to determine whether
there is "evidence of any substance whatever" to support the
Commission's Findings of Fact.
at 609.

Administrative Services, 658 P.2d

However, Petitioner does collaterally attack the

Commission's Conclusions of Law.

The Administrative Services

standard of review for the application of licensing law to the
facts, a mixed question of law and fact, requires the appellate
court to decide whether the Commission's determination was within
the limits of reasonableness and rationality.
Services, 658 P.2d at 609-12;

Administrative

In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32, 36 (Utah

App. 1988).
The Commission, composed of four professional real
estate brokers and one lay person, determined that Petitioner was
Barbara Homeyer's real estate agent from January to October 1982.
Petitioner's attorney argues in her brief that absent a "listing
agreement" or "earnest money agreement" there was no contractual
relationship between Petitioner and Barbara Homeyer.(Petitioner's
Brief p.12)

This contention ignores the fact that Ms. Homeyer

was a prospective buyer, not seller, therefore there was no house
to be listed for sale.

Earnest money agreements memorialize

- 15 -

offers and acceptances, and Petitioner's efforts in Ms. Homeyer's
behalf never got to the point where a formal offer was tendered.
It would be a rare event indeed for a buyer's agent to enter into
a written contract with her principal prior to the point where an
offer was tendered to a seller via an earnest monery sales
agreement.
The record clearly indicates that Petitioner was Ms.
Homeyer's real estate agent, and that relationship existed from
at least January to October, 1982. (Findings of Fact, nos.
4,9,10)

Petitioner also took possession of much of Ms. Homeyer's

personal property for the purpose of safeguarding that property
and facilitating its use in the purchase of a home from a
prospective seller. (Findings of Fact, no. 4)

Petitioner had

never undertaken a real estate transaction involving the amount
of property owned by Ms. Homeyer, and she did not involve her
broker either in the decision to use the personal property for a
down-payment or in her taking possession of the property.
(Transcript, pp. 166,167)

Although, Ms. Homeyer made a number of

demands for an accounting of her property and its disposition, as
well as demands for the return of the unsold property, Petitioner
failed to adequately answer those demands.
nos. 8,10)

(Findings of Fact,

Ms. Homeyer was forced to initiate litigation against

Petitioner, wherein by stipulation a value was placed on her
property.

Ms. Homeyer eventually won a judgment against

Petitioner and recovered some of her property, but has never
recovered any monies from Petitioner due to Petitioner's
converting her pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy into a Chapter 7.
(Findings of Fact, nos. 11,12,13)

It was to the facts above that the Commission had to
apply the special body of law which governs the real estate
profession.

Certainly, there was evidence that Petitioner was

Ms. Homeyer's agent for the purpose of aiding her in locating and
purchasing a home.

According to both Ms. Homeyer and Petitioner

that relationship was established in January 1982.

In Division

Exhibit 7, an October 21, 1982 letter from Petitioner to Barbara
Homeyer, there is very clear reference on the second page to
Petitioner's past and current efforts to find some kind of home
for Ms. Homeyer to purchase using proceeds from the sale of the
Homeyer personal property.

Therefore, there was adequate

evidence of an ongoing real estate agent/principal relationship
into October 1982.

It was incumbent upon the Commissioners to

use their knowledge and expertise in the real estate profession,
as Petitioner's peers, to determine if Petitioner's conduct as a
real estate agent violated the standards of the profession.

The

Commission found that Petitioner's actions in regards to Ms.
Homeyer's property once she came into possession of it was
patently wrong.

First of all, she violated Rule 9(a)(7) of the

Rules of the Commission, by failing to deliver the property to
her broker.

Secondly, Petitioner consistently acted in a manner

inconsistent with the best interests of her principal, Ms.
Homeyer, by: selling items without authorization and failing to
remit sale proceeds to Ms. Homeyer;

failing to return property

upon demand; failing to account for property or monies in her
possession;

delivering property to third parties, which was

unrecoverable by Ms. Homeyer; and selling property at below fair
market value.

The end result of Petitioner's actions were that Ms.
Homeyer never did get a house, and the property she had hoped to
use as a down-payment was to a large extent dissipated and lost.
Ms. Homeyer was forced to litigate her rights against Petitioner,
and while she received a judgment against Petitioner, she never
recovered a penny of the judgment due to Petitioner's bankruptcy.
The Commission clearly found, based on the facts established in
the hearing, that Petitioner's actions were inconsistent with her
client's best interests, a serious breach of the fiduciary duty
owed by an agent to her principal, and in fact resulted in
serious harm to the client.

Therefore, a conclusion that

Petitioner was "unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such a manner as to
safeguard the interests of the public,"

was both reasonable and

rational.
Petitioner argues that the revocation of her license
was an unduly harsh sanction, and urges a lesser sanction on this
Court.

Again, the Court must review the sanction using the

intermediate standard set forth above.

Given the Commission's

expertise and knowledge of the real estate profession, was the
order revoking Petitioner's license reasonable or rational?
Petitioner would have this Court accept the premise
that the aggravating circumstances of this case should somehow be
mitigated by the simple passage of time.

The fallacy of that

premise is that time in no way mitigated the damage that
Petitioner's actions caused.

The fact of the matter is that

during much of the intervening six years, Ms. Homeyer was

struggling through the litigation resulting from Petitioner's
actions.
Petitioner also skirts the issue that this is the
second disciplinary action taken against her license.

In Case

No. 1737, Petitioner was disciplined by the Commission for gross
incompetence and violating the fiduciary duty she owed her
clients.

Interestingly, Petitioner's activity in the earlier

case was contemporaneous with the Homeyer matter.

In Case No.

1737, Petitioner's license was also revoked, but revocation was
stayed in favor of a one year suspension of her license, followed
by a two year period of probation.

After an unsuccessful appeal

to the Third District Court in that case, which resulted in the
court's upholding the Commission's Order,

Petitioner served her

suspension during 1985-86.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that the
Division of Real Estate thoroughly investigates each licensee,
and therefore the issuance of broker's licenses or the absence of
intervening disciplinary action is a "seal of approval."

The

Division's resources are such that only complaints which are
brought to the Division's attention can be investigated, and
there is no sweeping, ongoing investigation of the real estate
industry.

The complaint which resulted in the November, 1987

filing of Case No. RE-87-08-02 was made only several months prior
to then.

Had the Division been aware of this case prior to that

point in time, it certainly would have taken earlier action.
Petitioner did receive a broker's license in January 1987, prior
to this compliant being made to the Division, based upon the
information which she provided to the Division.

The Commission is in the best position to judge the
appropriateness of sanctions, and how those sanctions will
protect the public.

Given the circumstances of this case-the

egregious nature of Petitioner's breach of fiduciary duty to her
client, the ongoing finaancial harm suffered by that client, and
the prior disciplinary sanction-the Commission acted reasonably
and rationally in ordering the revocation of Petitioner's
license.
CONCLUSION
Administrative disciplinary proceedings are neither
civil nor criminal actions and are therefore not subject to a
general statute of limitations.

If the Legislature had intended

to limit disciplinary actions in the area of real estate
licensing, it would have specified such a limitation in the
statutes governing the Department of Business Regulation or the
Division of Real Estate.

But rather than providing a statute of

limitations, the Legislature provided that the Commission and the
Executive Director could take disciplinary actions "at any time"
a licensee was found guilty of the enumerated violations.
The Commission's Conclusions of Law and Order were
reasonable and rational under the facts of this case and the law
applicable to it- The Commission is charged with assisting in the
regulation of the real estate profession so as to protect the
public welfare.

Certainly as a group of Petitioner's peers, the

Commissioners are in a much better position to judge her conduct
and the effect that conduct has on the public and the profession.

THEREFORE, the Division respectfully asks the Court to
affirm the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order revoking the license of Juanita Taft Rogers to act as a
real estate principal broker in the State of Utah.
SUBMITTED this

^5

day of October, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General of Utah

byt

^jyfrjxjc.

SHtflLA PAGE f#4«9&y
Assistant Atfe<frney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div,
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 538-1019
Attorneys for Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to be mailed, postage prepaid, on
this

. S" day of October, 1989, to:

Gary B. Weight, Esq.
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "LM
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Attorney for Petitioner
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APPENDIX

BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the license of Juanita Taft Rogers
to act as a Real Estate Principal Broker

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE-87-08-02

Appearances:
Sheila Page for the Division of Real Estate
Gary H. Weight for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on September 20,1988 before J. Steven
EkJund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Business Regulation. Thereafter, certain
preliminary motions were presented by respective counsel.
Based thereon, Counts I and III set forth in the Petition, dated November 25,1987, were dismissed.
Further, Count IV was amended to reflect the rule to be properly designated therein. Respondent's motions
to dismiss the ins'uuu proceeding on the basis that the hearing should be conducted by the Commission
rather than the Administrative Law Judge and that the Division should be estopped to take any action on
Respondent's license were denied
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Administrative Law Judge, being fully in the
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed as a sales agent by the Division of Real
Estate. As relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with principal broker David R. Harman as of January
1982. On September 1,1982, she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with
principal broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her affiliation with Mr.
Michaels and became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company.

2. By Order, dated August 17,1983, Respondent's license was suspended for one year and
thereafter placed on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Said order was based
on conduct which occurred between December 10,1981 and August 22,1982. Respondent's conduct in that
regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation of thefiduciaryduty owed to her clients
in that transaction. Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on January IS, 1987.
3. In January 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing
a home. Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced, resided in a home jointly owned by herself and her exhusband. Since there had been no property settlement relative to her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's ex-husband
was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide
a down payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various items of inherited personal property.
4. During Januairy 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement, whereby
Respondent was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective seller who
would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down payment for the purchase of a home. On February
21,1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer then delivered that
property to Respondent, which was held in storage under Respondent's control. The property was so
transferred to Respondent as the means to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate Respondent's
access to that property if a prospective seller was located.
5. Between February and late-April 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as to those items of
Ms. Homeyer's personal property which would be acceptable in lieu of a cash down payment. When it
became apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the above-described terms would be realized, she
authorized Respondent to sell certain items as the means to provide cash for the down payment necessary to
purchase a home.
6. During March and April 1982, Respondent had some of Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and
certain items were sold in antique shows. However, as of late April 1982, no progress in locating a
suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer had received no monies from Respondent relative to the sale
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of some of her property and Respondent had taken certain property from storage and sold it without Ms
Homeyer's authorization Further, Respondent never advised her principal broker of her acDviues nor did
she deliver to him any of the funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property.
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer underwent foot surgery and was advised that her
condiuon could be cancerous. At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether
that would occur pnor to her possible death. On May 5,1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Respondent and
they executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of her personal property *o Respondent
for sale and/or exchange and authorized Respondent to liquidate that property. The agreement further
provided that if all property held by Respondent was not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor children.
8 During the next two months, Ms Homeyer was never advised as to the status of her property
and was unable to contact Respondent in that regard In mid-July 1982, Ms Homeyer retained counsel and
made written demand that Respondent return all personal property in her possession and provide an
accounting as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property which had been in her possession
9 By letter, dated October 21,1982, Respondent generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts
which had been undertaken to appraise, restore and/or sell some of the property in her possession
Respondent further menuoned various costs incurred as to the appraisal and restoration of that property
Respondent alsoreiteratedthat her efforts had been undertaken to produce funds necessary for a down
payment for a home or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had yet been
identified Respondent requested Ms. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what you want to do with the
housing thing" and she advised Ms. Homeyer of a hsung for a two bedroom townhouse duplex and pondered
that Ms Homeyer could live in one side and rent the other.
10 By letter, dated October 28,1982, Ms. Homeyer advised Respondent that purchase of the
duplex would not be economically feasible and reiterated that no accounting had been received as to the
status of her property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated October 29,1982, a second demand was
made that Respondent return all items of personal property entrusted to her. When compliance with that
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demand was not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No accounting was provided to Ms.
Homeyer until July 9,1986,, when Respondent returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin.
11. By Stipulation, dated October 7,1986, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent identified the status of
tome of the property which had been in Respondent's possession. That property consisted of guns,
cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin collection, silver, jewelry,flatware,china, pewter, furniture,
household and other miscellaneous items. The value of the property which Respondent sold was agreed to
have been $6,530.50 and Respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property. It was agreed that
certain property, valued at $6,799.50, was delivered by Respondent to third parties and that said property had
not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer. It was also agreed that certain property still in Respondent's
possession should be valued at $4,820.50.
12. Some of the: property which Ms. Homeyer had delivered to Respondent was subsequently
returned to her. However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 30,1986, the Court
concluded that Respondent had sold some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with Ms.
Homeyer's possession and control of some of the property by intentionally refusing to return it and had
converted the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use. By reason thereof, the Court
entered judgment on October 30,1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer totalling $2,035.50 as a result of
Respondent's breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. Homeyer, $4,495.00 as a result of
Respondent's conversion of proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a result of Respondents
conversion of property upon transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as a result of Respondents
conversion of property still in her possession.
13. In the above-referenced Findings of Fact, the Court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated
bankruptcy preoceedings on July 22,1985 and thai Respondent had been listed as a creditor in said
proceedings. The Court further noted thai an order was entered in those proceedings on October 30,1985,
whereby Ms. Homeyer was discharged of all claims, including those of Respondent relative to expenses she
incurred in her efforts to repair, restore and dispose of Ms. Homeyer's property. The instant record also
reflects that Respondent initiated bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October 30,
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1986 Judgment, an order was entered in those bankropty proceedings relative to Respondent, whereby the
just-stated Judgment was discharged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent urges that her May 5,1982 agreement with Ms. Homeyer terminated the real estate
agent/principal relationship which had previously existed between them. Respondent further asserts that her
subsequent conduct pursuant to that contract had no relevance respecting her status as a licensed sales agent
and provides no basis upon which to enter a sanction as to that licensure. Respondent further urges that
there is no proper basis to now conclude she is incompetent or unworthy to practice as a principal broker,
inasmuch as whatever occurred prior to May 5,1982 does not reflect either a continuing or presently
existing pattern of misconduct
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, provides that a real estate license may
be suspended or revoked if the licensee is found guilty of:
(8)

being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associated broker, or
sales agent in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
*• *»*
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission, or the rules
adopted by the commission and the division.

Rule 9(a)(7) further provides:
All consideration received by a salesman in connection with a real estate transaction
in which he is engaged on behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by him to his
broker....
Upon a considered review of the conflicting evidence presented, Respondent's assertion that the
May 5,1982 agreement transformed what had been a real estate transaction between a principal and an agent
to that of a contract between private parties is not well founded. The May 5,1982 agreement does not
reference the previously existing relationship between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent and, importantly, does
not explicitly sever or alter that relationship. If it were Respondent's intent to effect a shift in her existing
relationship with Ms. Homeyer, it was incumbent upon Respondent to utilize language clearly reflective of
Ihat intent, particularly when Respondent had come into possession of Ms. Homeyer's property as her agent
in a real estate transaction, Respondent had already disposed of some of that property, and it was anticipated
that she would retain possession of the remaining property with the written authorization to liquidate it
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Nothing in the May 5,1986 agreement reflects that Ms. Homeyer no longer desired to obtain
another home or that Respondent would no longer attempt to locate a home for Ms. Homeyer.
Significantly, Respondent's efforts in thai regard did not cease after that agreement was executed. To the
contrary. Respondent acknowledged in her subsequent correspondence with Ms. Homeyer that continuing
efforts to locate a home had been made . As of October 21,1982, possibilities in that regard were still
being explored. Simply pot, the May 5,1982 agreement did not change the relationship between Ms.
Homeyer and Respondent as it relates to the purpose for which possession of Ms. Homeyer's property was
initially transferred to Respondent Thus, the manner in which Respondent disposed of that property is a
matter properly congizable by the Commission as to whether any basis exists to enter a sanction on
Respondent's licensure as a real estate principal broker.
Concededly, the transaction under review occurred approximately six years ago and there is no
evidence that Respondent has engaged in any misconduct since that time. Nevertheless, a violation of
Section 61-2-11(8) may lx established upon sufficient evidence of aggravated misconduct by a licensee
during the course of a single real estate transaction. The instant record clearly reflects that Respondent held,
sold or otherwise disposed of Ms. Homeyer's property in a manner entirely inconsistent with Ms.
Homeyer's interest in thai property. In certain instances, Respondent acted without authorization from Ms.
Homeyer and failed to safeguard the la tier's interest in the property which had been entrusted to her.
AJthough Respondent's conduct was not governed by an statutorily mandated fiduciary- duty between herself
and Ms. Homeyer, Respondent clearly owed such a duty as a sales agent to Ms. Homeyer throughout the
time under review and she failed to properly discharge that duty.
In addition to Respondent's breach of the fiduciary duty which she owed to Ms. Homeyer,
Respondent failed to deliver to her principal broker the consideration she received from the sale of Ms.
Homeyer's property. Thus, Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(15) and Rule 9(a)(7) relative thereto.
Furthermore, Respondent knew that she had been given the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer which
could be used to efTect the purchase of another home. Without explanation. Respondent failed to account
for those assets when repeated requests to do so had been made between July 1982 and October 1982, yet

she ostensibly held herself out to Ms. Homeyer as being willing to continue to assist in the search for a
home.
Arguably, the agreement between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent was somewhat unique and
Respondent may have engaged in relatively unconventional eflorts in her attempt to obtain a home for Ms.
Homeyer. Respondent may also have encountered unforeseen difficulties in liquidating the property to
generate cash and in her on-going relationship with Ms. Homeyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Respondent should have consistently acted in Ms. Homeyer's best interests and there is simply no evidence
that she did so. To the contrary, the egregious nature of Respondent's misconduct operated to produce
substantial financial harm to Ms. Homeyer. Based thereon, and given the disciplinary sanction which was
entered in 1983, an appropriately severe sanction should now enter as to Respondent's licensure.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate principal
broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective consistent with the provisions of Section 61-212(1X0Dated this

.day Of]
of December, 1988.

J. $cven Eklund
Administrative LawMudge

7

ORDER
The foregoing Findings
Recommended

Order

are

of

Fact,

Conclusions

accepted as written.

ordered that the Utah real estate license
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Law

It Is hereby
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Rogers will be revoked effective February 14, 1989.
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WILLIAM E. DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

the

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR
PO BOX 45802
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6747
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
In the Matter of
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS to Act
as a Real Estate Principal Broker

PETITION
CASE NO. RE87-08-02

The Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through
Its Director, Richard M. Mercer, upon knowledge and belief, hereby
complains and alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The cause of action was Investigated by the Division upon
complaints that Juanlta Taft Rogers (Rogers) has engaged In acts and
practices which constitute violations of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as amended).
JURISDICTION
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 provides that the Utah

Real Estate Commission may suspend or revoke the Real Estate license of
any salesagent or broker who, while engaging In acts for which such a
license Is required, Is found guilty of:
a.

•...(6) Falling within a reasonable time, to account

for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which belong to
others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those
funds from the purpose for which they were received;"
b.

"...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent to act as a

principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such manner as to
safeguard the Interests of the public;"

c.

*.. v15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order

of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the Commission and the
Dlvis Ion.
d.
his principal
2.

•...(16) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to
In a real estate transaction.

Rogers Is a real estate principal broker duly licensed by the

State of Utah
3.

under License No. PB 14700.

At all times material to this action, Rogers was acting in her

capacity as a real estate licensee.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

In January, 1982, Rogers was a salesagent affiliated with

principal broker David R. Harman.

On September 1, 1982, she terminated

t\er affiliation with Harman and became affiliated with principal
broker A.J. Michaels.

In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her

affiliation with Michaels and became affiliated with K.M. Wool ley &
Company.

Rogers' license was suspended from September 15, 1985 through

September 15, 1986, and placed on probation from September 15, 1986
through September 15, 1988, as a result of case #1737, which Involved
a 1981*1982 real estate transaction.

Rogers obtained a license as a

principal broker on January 15, 1987.
5.

In or about January, 1982, Homeyer and Rogers orally agreed

that Homeyer would give Rogers some Inherited personal property to
hold.

Rogers was to find a seller of a home

property Instead of cash for a down payment.

who would accept persona
If such a seller could

not be found, Rogers was to arrange for the sale of some of the
property to generate cash for a down payment.

t-f a sale was

consummated, Rogers would receive some of the personal property In an
amount equal to a 6% commission.
*

During February and March, 1982, Homeyer delivered numerous

units owned by a Mr. Miller.

Miller had ll*»ed the storage units for

sale with Rogers.
7.

A seller who was willing to take personal property was

not found.

On or about May 6, 1982, Homeyer gave Rogers written

authorization to liquidate the property.
8.

Rogers sold a number of Items for a total of $4,495.00 which

had a fair market value of $6,530.50.

Rogers did not deliver the sale

proceeds to her principal broker to hold In trust for Homeyer.

Rogers

gave possession of certain Items valued at $6,799.50 to various
Individuals with Instructions to repair, restore, or appraise the
I terns.
9.

In or about July, 1982, Homeyer orally demanded that Rogers

give her the proceeds of the sales and return the balance of the
personal property which had not been sold.

In July, 1982 and on

October 29, 1982, Homeyer's attorneys demanded that Rogers return
all property still held, and account for all property which had been
transferred, sold, or disposed of by Rogers. (^Rogers refused to comply
until ordered to do so by court order In July, 1986./
10.

Rogers did not turn over to Homeyer the $4,495.00 In proceeds

from the sale of Items, nor did she

retrieve the $6,799.50 worth of

Items which had been given to others to repair, restore, or appraise.
In addition, Rogers still had In her possession or had otherwise
disposed of other Items valued at $4,820.50.
11.

On October 30, 1986, Homeyer obtained a Judgment In the

amount of $18,150.00 against Rogers based on conversion of personal
property and sale proceeds and on breach of fiduciary duty.

After the

Judgment was entered, Rogers converted her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which
had been pending since 1981, to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Homeyer has

filed a $10,000.00 claim against the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
COUNT I

12.

The Di.islon realleges and Incorporates by reference its

allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 11 as If specifically
set out herein.
13.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (19539 as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked if the
licensee Is found guilty of:

"...(6) Falling within a reasonable time,

to account for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;*
14.

As outlined above, Rogers sold Items of personal property end

received $4,495o00, which she did not remit to Homeyer or account for.
Rogers commingled the funds with her own and expended them.
15.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah

Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (6) as amended.
COUNT I I
16.

The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference its

allegations set forth in paragraphs No. 1 through 15 as If specifically
set out herein.
17.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked if
licensee Is found guilty of: •...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent
to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such
manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;*
16.

As outlined above, Rogers received personal property

from Homeyer which was to be used In connection with a real estate
transaction, and failed to safeguard the property.
delivered to parties who did not return them.
Rogers or otherwise dissipated.
below market value.
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Code Annotated Section 61-2- 1.

s amended.
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24.

The Division

_v

'leges and Incorporates by reference Its

allegations set forth ... paragraphs 1 4o.

I through 23 as lf specIfIca I I i

set out herein.
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Utah Code Annotated Section f - r *• " P ^

provides that a real estate license may be suspended
the licensee Is found g\ jllty of:
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26. . Rule ±dt, adopted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated beet Ion
(1953, as amended
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equlres that all funds received by a licensee In
•

c i i • ""'i "I i|M«»#• d i p I I "IP ed to the principal broker an

• ' » >" »* itvi cikii-f a t r ust account within three bar ik I ng days.

27.

As out. lined above, Rogers sold Homeyer's personal property

to generate funds for a down payment on a real estate purchase, but did
not deliver the proceeds to her principal broker for deposit Into the
broker's real estate trust account.
26.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Rule

4.2 and Utah Code Annotated Section 61*2-11 (15) as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

That Rogers be adjudged and decreed to have engaged In the

acts alleged herein.
2.

That by engaging In the above acts* Rogers be adjudged and

decreed to be guilty of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-11 ($),
3.

(8), (15). and (16) (1953, as amended).

That Rogers license to act as a real estate licensee be

suspended or revoked accordingly.
DATED this
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day of

1987.

Zt*/J/A4&t

RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Appeared before me this

2&4—

day of

NOvenrvke.**'

1987.

who deposes and says that the Information listed above Is true to th<
best of his knowledge and belief.

6%jdfa++ k iS\^r^ULT
./ \

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:
. « »

Residing a t : ^tJJr \jM*-

U-*y,

x

LUrxX.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
»• rt*v served the foregoing

A C O D V of the foregoing document has been mailed this day prepaid
to Gary Selght. attorney for Juanlta Taft Rogers, at Aldrlch. Nelson.
Weight 8. Esplln. P.O. Box L. Provo. Utah 84603.

Dated at Salt Lake City. Utah this J_

«*«y °<

1987.
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21 CttoW, 19B2
Rrovo, Utah

Antiques Z e x . Uiich / I personal property of Barbara Hcneyer...
Vt2T Barbara:
As I n*r.tic*>ed tc you a veek or so ago when you called, I have fi*ed 1.7 a current
i i s t cf all the izr:s which we found In yoo* one root wh*ch your ex-Surha^d had
locked. I told you I'd ge: that dene the day we went to see Star* Snith, attorney
i;i American Fork, Utah. Now that you decided not to go to Stan SnLth and that
Air: Young i s net representing jru, I hove asked Barbara to deliver a copy of
the personal property hst to Mr. R*tert Mbody. I apologize for ncc gettiri t to you sooner, but hope dropping i t off to Mr. Moody's office will be a
help to you. I had also tcld ycc I'd have a copy of £ is l i s t dreppec off
at the office of .%Sr. Alan Young. I have asked Barbara to do that a l s o . . . . I
know he rroy not need i t new, but thought i t wouldn't hurt for hia to have i t
in his f i l e s .
The original docxer.r which you ask*d the*: we write 4 sign, when Betty oyta was
trc witnesst is in cJ-se hands of ny attorney, Mr. Stanley *. Smith of American
F.:rk, Utah. I sent you S 3ctty a note tellllng you tivt.vas where the original
dxirer.t was. I thought it best fr>r neither of %us to hold the docxant. I
\>z£*+ it givss "re full liquidation r^tspcr^ibility S/or seTing as is or i a
restored condition. Hc\.ever, the rain antiq-.-e shew that sells the nvst *s
in April... There i s ncv one in SX b~t I crr-nct afford tu pay the S2JC.'JG ar.tr/
fee and the iXO-wX) for a van to teul the iters ther* *id then pay $uO>5-0C
f^r.laijoj to 'r.rjc1' and sell and nan the fco/h fcr fou~ full davs. I *usc paid
_ ^ > . A tu .*i>e i-j* l i t t l e tanles refinishel. and I \ : get to dig up t!v f:r*ii
S&o.OU to pay for the iters refi^sr.ed by tt:*. lady (h^tovl died) in C-uiinrni^.
nave >cu any 4*ep p ckets of gold? The retvoritim and Aipplr^ have toc^Ied
abix.t Sl.SX.CO f rr the itess. Hc^ve:, thtv shcJld -ak': err^h to ccver that
end upholster thi ireirs in the spring Siile. l . . a s I •a.^tioreJ e r i i e r , thc
Gx> Coo Cio-J* w^s evaluated by a Mr. Lottar Jccka (Genu*. Cock s f e r i i l i i t ) and
he snid i t would tc*e S500.0Q in parti* and Utirr to g<.r i t Ln vor.cr* c^diti-x
and the ler.st it --cild cost would be $3:0.00....and h* thought i : cruld not K-11
for any ixre than t!*t. Houcer, I found r*nother nun w s&iU it can b* restore:
for l ^ s f but h/» w.uld c i l l x the quote before they surtc-d wcrk x r . . , , . I
told him to pwt i t oi hold as I could K-Z feed any more ccney into th* iter*
at:that tire. The;? i s a private busir.sss in SIC who a y trie STK C: the iiijy*:
piecas on consijrrft ard perhaps they'll sell by Xie~. iiuwever, he trir>s thpy
a^ht to go nrr-i.y in the spring show. T i l pun to .-n:er th*?.t u^ae enj get
s a x of this tuned into Cisi:. V I tcld yoj# T WHS .tlo xo give >t.>. »i>iver sn
anti^-e o; rri;^ sppriistd at >*7$.0J to i^y for the t.;j v Jvxxs s - ^ prexreJ, p:c!-*d
and rjs.ned the bootn in SLC. She w u with '« tc h^* tie clock ev.u*itc\i
1br<-::.rat wt»e-.':r told y x i t *uJ *oM «.«;e^<ere for S1.9CO.00 ha-u :c lx» d:curing.
*--•*—'i*** \g±i j - s*xh poor c;naiticn t f».»i.v s w«» shuuld hj.e sol.! it i l l ai mc
-*•»- ?>nr tr«e £::•*: a^ralse* of SJ/TU.'T for the
l;
— <^ I cun scrape up

t
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